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CRITICAL INDICATORS IN YUGOSLAV-COMINFORM PROPAGANDA: FIFTH REPORT

25X1 This report [] considers only Satellite charges of a military nature, charges which most directly and most convincingly aim at creating psychological tension. It continues a series of detailed quantitative studies of current military charges based on counting and analysis at sentence level.

I. Resistance to Military Preparations

During the past ten weeks Satellite radios have continued their relatively high attention to Yugoslav resistance to Tito's military preparations. Within this frame of reference, however, there are few propaganda shifts suggestive of more threatening intentions, psychological or military. That evidence is as follows:

a. Magnitude: Since late June Satellite claims of resistance to Yugoslav military preparations have more or less leveled off, although there is considerable weekly variability. Before that time--which coincides with the 3rd anniversary of Tito's break with the Kremlin--these charges mounted consistently for seven consecutive weeks. Thus, while resistance to aggression claims now constitute a large part of the war of nerves propaganda concerning Tito (about one-third of the total of such propaganda), Satellite propagandists have shown no desire to increase tension even more by continuing to increase the number of these claims.

b. Groups Resisting: Four main groups are said to be resisting Tito's preparations for war, according to Cominform radios. These groups are: civilians, youths (refusing to undergo pre-military training), Army personnel, and guerrillas. Discussion of Army and guerrilla resistance presumably implies the weakness of the Yugoslav regime more convincingly than does discussion of resistance by youths and civilians generally. Allusions to Army resistance have certainly not increased in the past four weeks. Attention to guerrillas--always low--has declined in the past four weeks as compared to the previous two-month period when partisan charges first reappeared. These facts reveal no tendency to shift attention from the less threatening resistance groups to those whose resistance could be most dangerous to the regime--guerrilla groups and most especially the Army.

c. Calls for Resistance: Coincident with last summer's increase in resistance-to-aggression claims, Satellite transmitters for the first time specifically issued calls for resistance as contrasted to the more usual descriptions of resistance. Such calls** were most frequent from mid-July to mid-August. Never very numerous (maximum week: 24 out of a total of 506 for all resistance-to-aggression claims), such calls in the six weeks since then have been practically non-existent (seven calls in six weeks). These figures suggest that the calls (some of which were practically phrased in terms of orders) were interjected at the beginning of the whole resistance-to-aggression campaign to spark the general theme. Their near-absence now might further suggest the campaign has assumed a more routine character in the minds of Satellite propagandists.

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** The source of these calls is interesting. It is not the border Satellites who are responsible for most of these appeals for resistance, but rather the Czech radio. Some 13% of all its allusions to resistance to aggression were represented by such calls. For Albania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, the like figure was 5.6% each. The comparable figure for the Rumanian radio was only 4%, despite the fact that it broadcasts more resistance claims than the others.

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d. Qualitative Characteristics of Resistance-to-Aggression Claims:

Efforts to increase the effectiveness and conviction of resistance-to-aggression propaganda can be reflected in several ways not dealing with the actual nature of the contention. Such efforts may involve such qualitative elements as: newness or uniqueness; the amount of detail; association with a current event; and appearance in "news items" (as contrasted with commentaries). Examination of the resistance-to-aggression claims with respect to these qualitative indices reveals that:

(1) The percentage of claims about resistance to Yugoslav military preparations in news items is quite low--about 5%.

(2) Only 5% of the claims are explicitly linked with events usually exploited in the military context.

(3) Between 15% and 20% of the claims are new. This is undoubtedly related in part to the relative recency of the campaign centered on the resistance-to-aggression theme. Nonetheless, it represents a considerable effort to be original and hence convincing--more so, at any rate, than is true of armed forces charges* against Yugoslavia, only 6% of which have been new. In recent weeks, however, the proportion of new claims relating to resistance to aggression have not increased.

(4) Resistance claims containing details are fairly numerous. (Detail is defined to include references to place-names, quantities, proper names, and time.) Currently about one out of every four claims of Army resistance to Tito contains a detailed or specific element. This ratio is higher than specificity ratio normal to armed forces charges and again appears to indicate a special effort. Recent weeks, however, show no upturn in this ratio.**

e. Allusions to "Civil War": As yet Satellite transmitters have in no way referred to the probability or actual existence of "civil war." The type of claim most nearly approaching this subject is that relating to guerrilla actions. Even within the small number of guerrilla claims voiced by Satellite radios, however, there is little evidence of a desire to picture the widespread growth of such a movement, which could in time lead to the propaganda development of a civil war argument. Quite the reverse is true. With the exception of a few general references to "large numbers" of people taking off to fight in the hills, most of the guerrilla claims to date have centered around two incidents of alleged guerrilla actions.*** Satellite radios hark back to these incidents again and again, as does Radio Moscow. This pattern is in marked contrast to allusions to civilian resistance which abound with numerous examples and varied incidents. It almost seems as if the propagandists have been specifically restricted to these two alleged incidents.

Satellite propaganda has yet to make a convincing case out of its guerrilla charges, as for example by naming guerrilla leaders, citing details as to numbers involved, locations of operations, and the like. The potentialities for developing this theme thus remain intact for possible future use.

* The term "armed forces charges" as used throughout this report refers to a group of charges relating to supplies, equipment, training, strength, and operations of the Yugoslav Army.

** See paragraph IV for examples of some of these charges.

*** First broadcast in the fall of 1950 was a report of a "massive armed rebellion" of workers in Cazin against whom Tito sent the 179th regiment. Many of the soldiers reportedly joined the successful workers. During the past summer an incident allegedly occurred in which "a group of youthful partisans engaged Rankovic's men for eight hours"; a partisan succeeded finally in escaping and telling the story of the fight.

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II. Armed Forces Charges

Since the end of July there has been no increase in the total number of charges related to the armed forces--including equipment, personnel, and operations--nor is there any increase in the portion of these charges beamed to the Satellite home audiences. Charges of an operational nature remain at their constant low level--currently about 3.5% of all armed forces charges--and most of them are related to general and non-detailed assertions regarding maneuvers. For example, since the end of July there has been only one charge (broadcast to Yugoslavia) regarding operations beyond the Yugoslav borders. This was made in the context of Tito's interview with Marguerite Higgins.

During the past 10 weeks there has been somewhat less emphasis on charges related to arms, equipment, strategic roads, etc., than in the previous period; but there has been an increase in charges related to personnel, particularly charges that foreign, i.e., British and American, officers are teaching Yugoslav soldiers. Two new charges (which have not yet been exploited to any extent) are that Yugoslav soldiers will be trained in the United States,* and that the Yugoslav Army will be directly under Eisenhower.

Qualitative Indices: The absence of an increase in the quantity of armed forces charges is accompanied by a similar absence of qualitative shifts. Charges considered to be of a more belligerent nature--such as the citing of a specific target of attack, details as to place-names, numbers, or units,** etc.--have not significantly increased. Since the end of July, the number of times a specific Satellite has been named as the target of a Yugoslav attack is only slightly more than one-half the comparable number during the previous 10-week period. Similarly, the charges citing Western military collaboration with Tito have been reduced from last summer's heavy emphasis on American arms shipments. Detailed naming of locations remains fairly constant; more than two-thirds of the relevant charges, however, are made only to Yugoslav audiences.

III. Denials of Military Preparations

Continuing their previous practice, the Satellite radios, during the subject period, have shown no tendency to deny Yugoslav charges related to the Satellite armed forces; during the past 10 weeks, only one such denial*** was made, and it was not beamed to Satellite audiences. On the other hand, Satellite denials of border violation charges made by the Belgrade radio have increased somewhat in the past few weeks. This was true particularly of the Albanian protest note of 19 September which seemed to reflect sensitivity over the fact that the last Yugoslav note concerning Albanian border violations was dispatched to the United Nations in early September. The Albanian note contained five denials and it was broadcast six times, three times in the Albanian home service--an unusual departure.

IV. Statements Which Continue to be Avoided

Satellite transmitters still refrain from making the statement that Yugoslavia is trying to threaten them. Statements that Yugoslavia constitutes a continuing threat, on the other hand, are still made though rarely--during the past ten weeks only 7 such charges occurred.

* This charge was first heard in the Rumanian home service on 29 September.

** Actually, Satellite radios very rarely allude to specific army units. The only recent case was contained in a Budapest broadcast on 3 September which stated: "Several units of the First Army Corps are already carrying out training with U.S. Sherman tanks and Cobra and Mustang fighters." (For an example of the detail Satellite radios might use in the future, [redacted] which quotes an item distributed only by the Rumanian press service in Morse code last January. The item gives many order-of-battle details concerning the disposition of Yugoslav Army and Air units along the Albanian frontier, naming towns in which specific units are located.)

*** Concerning Satellite troop strength exceeding peace treaty limitations.

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V. Satellite Self-Strength

Claims of self strength continue to be avoided in broadcasts to Yugoslavia. During the past 10 weeks only 10 such claims were made; and seven of them occurred at the end of August during the week which included such events as the Rumanian liberation anniversary, the Polish Airforce Day, and the anniversary of the establishment of the Bulgarian border guards. Even in the home services there is no increase in strength claims except when related to similar anniversaries. Consistent with the policy of de-emphasizing self strength, expressions warning of the consequences to Yugoslavia if she were to attack are extremely rare. Only five such warnings have been broadcast (all in the home services) since mid-May. None have occurred in the past month, however.

VI. Rare and Unusual Charges

As noted above, there has been no over-all qualitative change in the nature of the military charges. Recently, however, there have appeared isolated statements and unusual statements of a threatening nature. If the Satellites wished to intensify the war of nerves they presumably could be expected to increase these kinds of statements in both quantity and variety. As pointed out, military self-strength assertions are not prominent. The only recent qualitative departures have been the following statements. They are unusual because they explicitly identify Tito as the enemy in the context of self strength.

"If the imperialists... and their servant Tito will attempt to desecrate the beloved soil of our fatherland..., we, the soldiers of the People's Army will not stint any sacrifice to smash their attempts." (Rumanian Home Service, 23 August)

"These (Tito) war incendiaries can be stopped by strength alone and we must therefore make our free country even stronger." (Hungarian Home Service, 25 August)

"It would be wrong for the Government of the Belgrade spies to misinterpret our self-possession and calmness." (Hungarian Home Service, 27 August)

Army resistance charges are for the most part of quite a routine nature. An exception is the following:

"Soldiers are establishing ties with underground partisan units so that they may be able to fight for freedom." (Tirana, in Serbo-croat, 25 August)

Other statements departing from the usual include:

"Particularly in the villages located in the border area officers of the People's Army are giving lectures on 'Tito's bandits--lackeys of the Anglo-American imperialists in the Balkans.'" (Bulgarian Home Service, 16 August)

"Tito has promised in the event of war to send troops to Austria and Greece." (Polish Home Service, 29 August)

Current broadcasts do not indicate any increase in the number of such unusual or more threatening charges. On the contrary there appear to be fewer departures from routine and stereotyped accusations during the past week.

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